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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 153, O.P.E.I.U.

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 0298 87

AFSCME, D.C. #37

The stipulated issue is:
Was there sufficient and reasonable cause for
the discharge of Rhonda Barber? If not, what
shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on January 15, 1988 at which time Ms.
Barber, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of Local 153 O.P.E.I.U., hereinafter referred to as the
"Union" and AFSCME, D.C. #37, hereinafter referred to as the
"Employer," appeared.

All concerned were afforded full oppor-

tunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The grievant was discharged for a cumulative record of
chronic lateness.

The disputed areas of this case are narrow.

The grievant's extensive lateness record is not disputed, nor
does the Union dispute that she was subjected to the various steps
and procedures of the Employer's "lateness policy."

Though uni-

laterally promulgated by the Employer the applicability and validity of that "policy" is not challenged by the Union.

Nor does

the Union challenge the fact that the grievant was previously
warned and suspended, as a means of progressive discipline in the
implementation of that policy.

Those disciplinary penalties were

not grieved and/or arbitrated by the grievant or by the Union on
her behalf.
The Union's defense on behalf of the grievant is that the
latenesses that triggered her discharge were of only a few minutes
each, totalling nine minutes; were therefore de minimum and
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insufficient to justify discharge, and that the grievant was
discriminately treated more severely than other employees similarly situated with lateness records equally bad.

Relying on the

well settled rule that discipline must be evenhandedly and uniformly applied to all employees similarly situated, the Union
argues that regardless of how chronic or cumulative the grievant's
record may be, the penalty of discharge is unreasonable and unfair, and should be set aside.
Let me deal with the de minimus argument first.

Of course,

standing alone a series of latenesses of only a minute or so each,
totalling 9 minutes, is not grounds for discharge.

But as the

last series of latenesses of a chronic lateness record that has
prevailed for an extended period of time, and which as here
follows the progressive disciplinary penalties of warnings and
a suspension and further warnings, does constitute the "trigger"
event for discharge, the final

disciplinary step, because those

final latenesses represent reasonable evidence to the Employer
that the affected employee is unable or unwilling to correct his
failings.

That is what we have in this case.

Also, as the parties

well know, an employer is entitled to expect and insist on regular
and prompt attendance by employees, and records of excessive lateness and/or absenteeism, which continue uncorrected is and are
ultimately grounds for discharge even if the circumstances are beyond the employee's fault or control.

Hence, the grievant's

transportation troubles are immaterial.
The Union has not adequately proved its principal

assertion

that the penalty of discharge imposed on the grievant was discriminatory, uneven treatment or excessive when compared to other
employees allegedly with equally poor records.

-3The Union contends that other employees who were given suspensions for lateness records as bad have not been fired; that
other employees were given suspensions of one week whereas the
grievant's suspension preceding her discharge was two weeks; and
that at least one other employee was given a second suspension
or multiple suspensions rather than suffering discharge after the
lateness record continued subsequent to the first suspension.
That other employees have not been fired following their
suspensions, is inapposite to this case, because the Employer has
shown that those employees improved their records following their
suspensions and therefore there were no subsequent incidents to
"trigger" a discharge.

In the instant case, the grievant's late-

ness record continued following her suspensions, thereby setting
up the conditions for her dismissal that were not set up with
regard to the others.
That the grievant was given a 2 week suspension whereas others
got one week is satisfactorily explained by distinctions made by
the Employer on the basis of "seniority and intensity" of the employees involved.

In the absence of any evidence of arbitrari-

ness and capriciousness, I view this distinction as a proper
exercise of managerial authority, based on rational and reasonable
differences.

More important is the fact that the grievant's 2

week suspension was not challenged when imposed, and therefore
must stand and cannot now be impeached.

If the Union believed

it was excessive when compared with others, the time to assert
that charge was when the grievant suffered the 2 week suspension.
To do so now is to open a prior disciplinary action that is no
longer challengeable.
The Union has better, but not determinative grounds, in
claiming that one employee Mr. Beckman and possibly others received

-4two or more successive suspensions, whereas the grievant was discharged following her first, and that a distinction between Mr.
Beckman and the others cannot be made on the basis of seniority
or otherwise.
The record before me contains some evidence of an unclear
nature, that some few other employees including Mr. Beckman received multiple suspensions, whereas the grievant was fired following her first suspension.

These examples are few in number, in

comparison to the total number of employees discharged, and, with
the exception of Beckman are explained by the Employer, without
refutation by the Union, to have involved employees who complied
with the Employer's request that they specify the reasons for their
lateness.

By contrast the grievant refused or failed to do so

when asked or given the opportunity to do so, before she was fired.
Considering the questionable probative value of the references to
those other employees, I accept the Employer's explanation of
distinctions between them and the grievant as a legitimate basis
for different disciplinary treatment.
As for the Beckman situation, I find no specific differences
between his record and status and the grievant's at the time he
was accorded a second suspension, but as "one swallow does not
make a spring," I am not prepared to find that a single exception
to the employee's disciplinary process for the offense of chronic
lateness, is grounds to upset the grievant's discharge.

The

grievant had adequate warnings and a proper suspension, and had
ample notice that her job was in jeopardy if her lateness record
did not improve.

She failed to improve that record, leading to

the Employer's reasonable conclusion that she was and would be
chronically unreliable.

Against this backdrop the Beckman

ation is too thin a reed to cling to or on which to rely.

situ-
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The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
There was sufficient and reasonable
cause for the discharge of Rhonda
Barber.

DATED: February 10, 1988
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York ) k " "

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Arlington Teachers Association

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1939 0211 87

and
Arlington Central School District

The stipulated issue is:
Did the District violate Article I and/or Article
VIII Section K of the 1986-88 collective bargaining agreement in assigning Eileen Weber and Cheryl
Gallagher for the 1987-88 school year? If so what
shall be the remedy under the contract?
A hearing was held in Poughkeepsie, New York on March 11,
1988 at which time Ms. Weber and Ms. Gallagher hereinafter referred to jointly as the "grievants" or separately as Weber and
Gallagher, and representatives of the above-named Association and
District appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

Each side filed a

post-hearing brief.
During the 1986-87 school year, Weber, a special education
teacher, taught one section of primary language in the LaGrange
Elementary School.
During the 1986~87 school year, Gallagher, also a special
education teacher taught one section of elementary language in
the LaGrange Elementary School.
In the 1987-88 school year, at the LaGrange Elementary
School, Weber was assigned to teach Level II language, and
Gallagher was assigned to teach Intermediate Skills Development.
Both carried out those assignments.
It is stipulated that Weber and Gallagher hold appointments
in the Special Education Tenure area; are assigned within the
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special education tenure area and are certified to teach any
special education class in New York State.
The Association claims that the 1987-88 school year assignments for the grievants represented "involuntary transfers" within the meaning of Article VIII Section K of the contract; that
they were not unavoidable, and therefore were improper.

And that

this contract breach is inconsistent with the mutual purposes and
obligations of the contract as set forth in Article I (Preamble).
The District's position is not that the new assignments were
unavoidable, but that the contract language notwithstanding, subsequent statutes, and regulations, namely P.L. 94-142 and Article
89, New York State Education Law supercede the contract and are
determinative in this case.

The District explains that with the

passage of those Federal and State laws; with their implementation under certain regulations, court decisions and the Individualized Education Plans, special education methodology and classes
were changed and that the grievants' assignments for the 1987-88
school year reflected and were consistent with those changes.
The District points out that the external law referred to
above was enacted some five years after the negotiated language
of Article VIII (K) of the contract, and that the contract
language "could not have contemplated the requirements of Individualized Education Plans for educationally handicapped children."
Distinguished from prior school years the new assignments to Weber
and Gallagher were to classes and students "grouped in atypically
small classes, age grouped up to three years apart, and further
placed in terms of physical needs, management needs and social
adaptive skills."
Thus, as I see it, the District's case is based on its claim
that the subsequently enacted statute and regulatory implementation
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thereof are the controlling laws and that any contract language
to the contrary or inconsistent is preempted.

The District but-

tresses this view in its contention that quality education for
educationally handicapped children is what is really at issue, and
that the arbitrator should not overturn the modern procedures designed to meet that objective.
It should also be noted, that the external law notwithstanding, it is the District's position that the 1987-88 assignments to
the grievants, within the special education tenure area, did not
constitute re-assignment or transfer, but rather were consistent
with what they taught the prior year, and as with the prior year,
involved students "who functioned at different academic levels
and who required different adaptive instructional approaches and
progress at different rates."

That the mix of ages may be differ-

ent and the teaching methodology varied, is not, in the District's
judgment a re-assignment within the language and meaning of Article
VII(K) .
I do not doubt the District's good pedagogical intentions
with regard to the best methods to teach and train educationally and
physically handicapped children.
the "new approaches
laws.

Indeed I have no quarrel with

in implementation of the above referred to

But the question is not what the best teaching methodology

should be, but rather whether the grievant
if so, whether the contract was breached.

were re-assigned, and
The best pedogogical

methods are matters for other forums and persons other than
arbitrators.
Indeed, the District's case for quality education for the
students in the special education programs confirms, to my mind
at least, that signfleant changes were made between the school year
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of 1986-87 and 1987-88 in what was required of the grievants.

In

that respect I conclude that there was a sufficient different between the two years to conclude that for the latter school year
they were "re-assigned" within the meaning of Article VIII(K).
The external law relied on by the District brought about a
change in classroom structure and student mix.
education courses were organized was changed.
students in the grievants' classes changed.

The way special
The ages of the

New teaching material

was required, and new teaching techniques were to be employed.
Weber had taught Kindergarten and first grade.
of a second and third grade level.
second grade level to third and

She went to classes

Gallagher went from first and

fourth grade level; with a change

in emphasis from language development to skills development.

Each

had new classroom preparations.
Absent a specific contract definition of the meaning of reassignment in Article VTII(K), I am not prepared to conclude or
agree with the District that the foregoing differences and changes
in levels of teaching and instructional responsibility did not
constitute a "transfer" or "re-assignment" within the meaning of
Article VIII(K).
This is not to say that the District does not have the right
and perhaps the duty under the new education laws, to restructure
its special education class to bring together a different mix of
students at different levels and with different educational accomplishments and potential including those physically handicapped.
Indeed based on my reading of the contract there are no restrictions to the District's right to make the changes.

The only re-

striction is a procedural one regarding the assignment of teachers
to the new structure.

And that, not the District's right to make

changes, is what is at issue in this case.

-5I conclude therefore that the latter assignments of the grievants
violated Article VIII (K) of the contract.

I find they were "in-

voluntary transfers" to a "re-assignment," and the District does
not assert a defense of unavoidability.
The question therefore narrows to whether that violation is
nullified by the aforementioned statues and educational
tions.

refula-

I hold that I do not have the jurisdictional authority or

competence to consider that question.
I agree with Arbitrators Rabin and Sands (cited in the
Association's brief).

My authority is confined to the collective

bargaining agreement.

The arbitration provisions of the contract

caution the arbitrator "to limit his decision strictly
application and interpretation

to the

of the provisions of the agreement

and shall be without power or authority to make any decision contrary to or inconcsistent with, modifying or varying in any way,
of the terms of this agreement or of any applicable law or rules
or regulations of the force and effective(sic) law"

(emphasis

added).
Here, if the contract and external law are in conflict, my
authority as I see it, is to uphold the contract and confine my
decision to the contract terms.

To accept the District's view of

the meaning and impact of the external law cited would be for me
to interpret those laws, over which I do not believe I have jurisdiction and then to substitute those laws for the language of
Article VIII (K).

The latter would do violence to the contractual

caveat on the arbitrator's authority.

Also, under the arbitration

provisions, the only consideration of external law by the arbitrator is the warning that he may not "modify or vary" it.

Not

before me is the replacement of a contract clause by an external
law.

-6In short, external law which may vary and supercede the contract is not before me.

If the external law preempts any finding

or ruling confined to the collective bargaining agreement, it is
for another forum to so decide.
I do observe however that my rejection of the District's
argument that external law has been substituted for Article VIII
(K), does not mean that that law and Article VIII (K) cannot be
reconciled with mutual effectiveness.

As I previously stated, the

District may establish special education classes responsive to
and consistent with external law and in the interest of quality
special education, and still make appointments or assignments to
those classes under the procedures and conditions of Article VIII
(K).
I note that Article VIII (K) includes an important reference
to "good faith efforts."

That means to mean that reassignments to

newly structured special education classes can be effectuated by
good faith dealings between the District and the Association, and
that the interests of both, new educational methodology and protection from involuntary transfers, can be accommodated.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties,
makes the following AWARD:
The District violated Article VIII Section K of the 198688 collective bargaining agreement in assigning Eileen
Weber and Cheryl Gallagher for the 1987-88 school
year.
The remedy the Association seeks is granted, namely
that the District shall offer Eileen Weber a level
I primary language special education position; and
shall offer Cheryl Gallagher a level II primary
language special education position, both at the
La Grange Elementary School for the 1988-89
school year, provided such positions exist in
said school year.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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DATED: August 5, 1988
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) ss -:
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local Union 320, International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
AFL - CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Grievance G85-32

and
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the collective bargaining agreement between the Company and
Local 320 by assigning one Service Worker
using aerial lift equipment to perform work
in an elevated position? If so, what shall
be the remedy?

V

"

A hearing was held in Newburgh, New York on November 19,
1986 at which time Dominick Padavano, hereinafter referred to
as the "grievant," and representatives of the above-named Union
and Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportun-

ity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

A stenographic record was taken and the Union

and Company filed post-hearing briefs.

The parties waived the

Arbitrator's Oath.
The Union and the Company concede that the basic facts which
underly this grievance are not in dispute.
ified as a Service Worker.

The grievant is class-

As such, his duties include perform-

ing all line work and gas and electric service work, replacing
street light bulbs and collecting over-due bills and other related commercial work such as turn-ons and turn-offs.

Although

a Service worker can and does, without dispute, perform many of
these tasks alone, until August, 1985 at least two such workers
were assigned to all jobs which required work in an elevated position.

At that time, the Company directed that one Service Worker

normally perform such work on secondary conductors from the
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Company's bucket trucks in the elevated position.

The Company

made no mention of its new policy during the negotiations for
the labor agreement between the parties which ran from July 1,
1985 to June 30, 1987.

Indeed, the issue of the number of Service

Workers assigned to do aerial work on secondary conductors was
never discussed during any contract negotiations between the
Union and the Company.
Bucket trucks, which can be operated by and are designed
to accommodate one worker, are a relatively recent technological
development.

Prior to their introduction, aerial work required

that Service Workers either climb poles or use less maneuverable
platform trucks.
person crews.

The prior equipment necessitate more than one

The Company began to replace the older equipment

with bucket trucks in the early 1950's, but total replacement for
line or bulb work was not completed until sometime in the 1970's.
Due to the widespread adoption of bucket trucks, in about
1980 the Company, without Union participation or notification, began to study the feasibility of reducing from two to one the number
of Service workers required to do aerial work.

In connection

therewith, management personnel visited LILCO and CON ED, both
of which assigned one Service worker to aerial work whether the
work involved primary or secondary energized conductors.

The

Company's General Line Foreman's Committee then recommended that
one Service Worker be assigned to work in the elevated positions
on Secondary, but not primary conductors.

The Committee was con-

cerned about the possibility that a bucket might stall in the
elevated position.

It therefore recommended that each Service

Worker be supplied with an auxiliary "Rat-pac" radio which permitted him to operate the truck's main communication radio and

_ o_

to thus communicate with the Company's control center from the
elevated position.

LILCO and CON EDISON had implemented the same

safety precaution.

After the Foreman's Committee made its

recommendation, the Public Service Commission adopted a new
regulation which permitted municipalities to contract with other
companies to install and maintain street lights and fixtures.
Thus, the Company was threatened with the loss of its monopoly
with respect to these tasks.
Based upon the Foreman's Committee's recommendation, and
spurred by the Company's desire to reduce costs so as to compete
with other businesses for installation and maintenance work on
street lights, the Company implemented its new one-person
ment policy by phasing it in over several weeks.

assign-

The evidence

demonstrates that each Service Worker was instructed not to do
aerial work unless he had an operating Rat-pac radio.

They were

also told that if they required additional help for any particular job, they should so inform the system control center and no
reasonable request would be denied.^

Since the implementation of

the new policy, the Company has never refused any request for
back-up assistance.

1. The fact that Mr. Maher, President and Business Manager of
the Union', did not receive any written guidelines from the Company
or was not advised that employees were told that a Service Worker's
reasonable request for back-up assistance would not be refused,
is not probitive on the issue of whether workers received such information. The Company's witnesses testified that the Service
Workers were so informed. Indeed, even the grievant testified
that his foreman told him that if he called the control operator,
they would send out assistance at any time. (Record at page 54)
And he had subsequently requested such assistance and the Company
had never refused his requests. He also admitted that he was
permitted to raise any subject of safety at regularly scheduled
safety meetings run by his supervisors every two months or so.

-4The Union did not produce any evidence of a serious safety
problem which occurred as a result of the Company's new work
assignment policy.

Although in two incidents the bucket did not

function properly and the workers in the buckets needed to await
assistance (in one case, the wait was up to 45 minutes) to be
extricated, both were helped to the ground without injury.

One

Union witness, Mr. Swanson, testified that in 1984, prior to the
implementation of the Company's new assignment policy, his hand
had been caught in the bucket control and he was unable, by himself, to stop the bucket from rising.

A helper on the ground

then operated back-up controls and lowered him to the ground.
Swanson admitted that he did not report any such incident to the
Company, nor did he require any medical treatment for any injury
to the hand he claimed was caught in the controls.

In addition,

Swanson did not, at first, offer a persuasive explanation as to
why he did not use his other hand sto stop the bucket from moving.
The Union argues that the Company's past practice of assigning two Service workers when utilizing aerial lift equipment to
perform work in the elevated position is an implied condition of
the collective bargaining agreement between the parties.

Accord-

ingly, the practice which was in existence during the negotiations
leading to the agreement which ran from July 1, 1985 to June 30,

2. First, Mr. Swanson testified that he was unable to push the
hydraulic lift cutoff with his "free hand" because he was using
it to free the hand that was caught in the controls. He later
testified that that handle was also jammed with his other hand.
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1987, is binding on the parties and must be continued for the
life of the agreement, and the Company cannot unilaterally abrogate such a condition.

In support of its position, the Union

claims that the past practice is clear, consistent, unequivocal
and readily ascertainable over a reasonable period of time as a
fixed and established practice accepted by both parties.

Both

parties should have entered into negotiations with knowledge of
such a practice and the agreement must have been executed on the
assumption that the practice would remain in effect.

Since the

practice was unchallenged during the negotiations, the Company
must be held to have adopted it and make it part of the agreement.
The Union further argues that the current matter does not
present a crew size or manning issue.

The Union does not contend

that Service Workers must perform all of their work as a two-man
crew.

Rather the Union argues that two Service Workers must be

assigned when working in the elevated position.

Further, this

case involves an attempt by the Company to unilaterally change the
working conditions of Service workers.

Any unilateral change in

the past practice increases the amount of risk inherent in the job
because with only one person aloft there is no one on the job site
to assist in any emergency situation.
The Company argues that the explicit provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between the parties expressly
grants the Company the power to adopt the policy change at issue
in this proceeding.

Article IIA of the Agreement provides, in

pertinent part,:
"The management of the Company and the direction
of the working forces, including the right to
... determine the number and qualifications of
employees required to perform the work, are
recognized to be in the Company, except as
otherwise provided for in this agreement."
(emphasis added)
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The Agreement does limit crew size to require that "at least two
qualified employees" be assigned to any crew "working on energized
primary conductors" and that " at least two employees will make
energized secondary connections
Residential Distribution)."

associated with URD (Underground

However, there is no such limitation

on the work assignments at issue in this grievance.

Past pract-

ice cannot repeal the effect of the express, clear and unambiguous language of the agreement.

The only limitations on the

exercise of its "managment rights," is that the Company's action
must be reasonable and undertaken
are satisfied in the instant case.

in good faith.

Those standards

The change in the manning

assignment was implemented as a result of technological advances
and new regulations which required that the Company reduce its
labor costs to be competitive with other companies.

It was made

only after careful study had determined that the work could be
properly and safely performed by a one-person Service Worker
Other utilities had the same practice.

crew.

The only significant safety

concern raised by the change is that there might be a lack of
adequate communication between a man caught in a stalled bucket
and the Company's control center.

The requirement that no crew

member working alone should go into the elevated position unless
he had a working rat-pac radio eliminates that concern.

Addi-

tionally, the Company advised that a rope ladder or rappellent
device is provided for egress in the event that the bucket becomes stalled in an elevated position and the affected worker
has to exit the bucket without assistance.

Any other safety con-

cerns have been eliminated by the Company's policy of advising
each service worker that if he or she believes that more than one
person is required for the particular job, the Company would provide back-up assistance.

Since August, 1985, no such request has

ever been refused and no injuries attributable to the manning
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change have occurred.

Therefore, the Union has failed to demon-

strate that the Company's action has increased the amount of risk
inherent in the job.
Further, asserts the Company none of the duties of the
Service Worker has been changed nor has there been any lay-offs
or reductions in the number of Service Workers employed by the
Company.

Thus, the change in past practice involved only a new

direction to the working forces rather than a change in benefits
or things of value to the employees, without any adverse impact
on the bargaining unit.
OPINION
A careful review of the record and consideration of the
arguments of the parties has led me to conclude that the Union has
failed to satisfy its burden of establishing that the Company
violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement by its decision to
normally assign one Service Worker to work on secondary conductors
in an elevated position on bucket trucks.

Article IIA expressly

grants to the Company the right "to determine the number ... of
employees required to perform the work ... except as otherwise
provided for in this agreement."

No other provision of the con-

tract limits the Company's rights with respect to Service Workers
performing the work at issue in this proceeding.

Indeed, the fact

that the contract does restrict the Company's rights to determine
the number of employees to perform work in primary conductors and
URD tasks strengthens the Company's position in this grievance.
Those limiting provisions make clear that when the parties intende
to provide for minimum staffing leve^ls they did so by express
provisions in the written agreement.

Their failure to do so with

respect to the present matter indicates that the parties intended

-8no such limitation.
ment that Article HA

Nor do I find persuasive the Union's arguis irrelevant.

is clear and unambiguous.

The contract language here

The language of Article HA

does not

limit the Company's right to determine the number of employees
required for an entire job classification.

Nor does it exclude

from its coverage one or more specific tasks of a job classification.

Its clear wording makes it relevant to either or both,

as both encompass "performing the work."
It is well settled that past practice cannot effectively
repeal or vary the clear and unambiguous language of express
clauses which were contractually agreed to and in effect while the
past practice was being followed. 3

Indeed, no matter how long a

practice has been jointly followed, either side has the right, at
any time, to require that henceforth the contract language be
followed.

Only where the contract language is ambiguous or un-

clear, or where the contract is silent, does past practice prevail
However, as the Company concedes, the management rights
clause does not confer absolute power to the employer to make any
changes which are authorized by its literal language.

For example^

the Company cannot act unreasonably or create a significant increase in the risk to the safety of its employees.

The Union has

failed, however, to prove that the Company's action has violated

3. The Union also contends that the matter at issue herein constitutes a change in the employee's "working conditions." If that
argument is intended to raise the issue of whether there has been
a unilateral change in the conditions of employment within the
meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, the Union has raised
it in the wrong forum. If the Union's argument is only another
way of claiming that the past practice has contractual effect,
it is dealt with in this Opinion.
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these implied limitations on its management rights.
The Company's decision to adopt a one-person crew size for
aerial work was motivated by legitimate business concerns.

The

record reflects that the Company's change in policy in this regard
was an attempt to adjust its staffing in light of technological
developments and new regulations which altered the Company's
competitive position.

Further, the new policy was adopted only

after a thorough and careful review of all the consequences, including potential safety risks, and included an examination of the
practices of similarly situated utilities.

Although some Union

input might have been desirable, I cannot conclude that the Company's failure to obtain it made its decision-making process unreasonable or improper.
Nor has the Union satisfactorily proved that the reduction
of crew size has significantly increased the risk to Service
Workers.

The Union argues that a second man on the truck would

act as a "second pair of eyes" for the worker in the bucket and
help to avoid some unspecified or unlikely accidents.

That argu-

ment is, however, unsupported by the record because there have
been no accidents or injuries to any workers since the adoption
of the new policy.

More importantly, the issue is not whether a

"second pair of eyes" would reduce a risk.

Rather it is whether

the "second pair of eyes" is necessary for safety, and the work
performance is unreasonably unsafe without them.

The logic of the

Union's position would lead to the conclusion that the Company
could not reduce the number of workers on any job, aerial or not,
which involved.any possibility of accident.

Such a conclusion

would unduly hamper the Company's ability to adjust to new technological and economic developments, and make it an absolute
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guarantor of the safety of the job duties.

Neither the contract,

nor reasonableness requires that.
In an attempt to demonstrate that there is an increase in
the risk to safety directly attributable to the fact that a
Service worker will be working alone in an elevated position,
the Union argues that the worker may be unable to see various
hazards if he is working at night and the entire work area is not
properly illuminated; and that he may be subject to a risk of
accident related to the traffic in and around the vehicle.

With

respect to the lighting problem, the Company's witnesses testified
without contradiction, that all trucks are to be equipped with at
least two lights, one of which is an adjustable flood light.

In

addition, the Company will make available to each Service Worker
hard hats with lights.

As to the problem of traffic control, as

well as lighting, the Company has proved that each Service Worker
has been advised to request back-up assistance if he or she believes that such help is required.

Since the institution of the

new policy, the Company has never refused any such request.

In-

deed, the Company's change in staffing is not to completely substitute one worker for all tasks previously performed by two.

The

Company has simply provided one worker as the norm or general rule
but will provide more if any risk so requires,

The possibility

of obtaining a back-up on any particular job eliminates any signif
icant risk of harm to the Servie Worker resulting from traffic,
lighting or other problems.
The Union's claim that a Service worker may not be able to
extricate himself from a stalled bucket is also unconvincing.
Company has directed that no Service worker is to go into the

The

-11elevated position unless he has a working Rat-pac radion which
would enable him to call for help.

The Union's argument

that

such radios may not properly work because a particular job may
be in a "dead spot" is unpersuasive.

Each worker is instructed

to test his radio at a job site before going into an elevated
position.

If the radio does not work, the Company has directed

that the worker not undertake the job.

In addition, each worker

is supplied with a rapelling line or a ladder to enable him to
exit the bucket if he cannot obtain assistance or wait for help.
Lastly, the Union contends that the controls in the bucket
may be caught up or hung up on trees or wires, thus preventing a
worker in the bucket from controlling its movements.

Although

Swanson testified that he experienced such a problem while working on a two-man crew and was assisted by a second worker who
stopped his bucket, one such incident during the more than 30
years Service Workers have worked at their tasks does not constitute a prevalent or even probable condition sufficiently significant to bar the crew size change.

In addition, Swanson did

not adequately explain why or how he put himself into a position
where the bucket controls would become stuck on wires, or why he
did not use his free hand to use the automatic shut-off system.
For the reasons stated here, the grievance is denied.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate the collective
bargaining agreement by assigning one
Service Worker using aerial lift equipment
to perform work in an elevated position.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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DATED: April 15, 1988
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )ss':
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION AND AWARD
Case #12-30-0139-88

United Auto Workers, Local 405
and
Chandler Evans, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Was the December 11, 1987 discharge of Leon
Mantoni for just cause? If not what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held at the Company offices on June 29, 1988
at which time Mr. Mantoni, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Company
appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Each side filed a post-hearing brief.
The essential charge against the grievant, primarily responsible for his discharge^, is that he switched defective parts he
produced with good parts produced by other employees, and took
credit for the latter production.
the discharge must

If this charge is sustained,

be upheld as a "falsification of Company re-

cords" and as fraudulent conduct.

If not, the other attendant

charges against the grievant are not enough to warrant dismissal.
On the basic charge the quantum of evidence and the burden
of proof for a disciplinary case has been adequately met by the
Company.
The evidence and testimony, based on a Company investigation,
of the types, quantities, location, sequence, quality, and tagging
(or failure to tag) of

parts found in the grievant's production

boxes and those found in the boxes of other employees doing the

-2same work raise serious suspicions about the grievant's conduct.
When parts are in the respective boxes out of sequence; when one
layer of parts or the total in another employee's box contain
more than a quantity customarily defective, while the grievant's
boxes contain out of sequence good parts; when the grievant has
neglected to tag parts so that they cannot be identified with a
particular employee; and when this takes place in the face of
earlier warnings to the grievant that the Company believed he was
switching work, the circumstantial evidence in support of the
Company's position in this arbitration is substantial.
But if that is not enough, it is buttressed and made convincing by the testimony of Supervisor Thomas Marucki.

Mr.

Marucki testified that twice on December 4, 1987 he saw the
grievant switch parts.

Marucki was observing the grievant be-

cause two other employees had previously reported to him that
they saw the grievant switching parts.

The subsequent inventory

of the boxes involved showed the unusual and suspicious facts
previously stated.
Marucki's testimony was unimpeached and there is no evidence
or reason why he would testify falsely.

Considering all the

facts and circumstances, I conclude that he did not err as to what
he observed.
This offense by the grievant, who was a short service employee of about seven months, constitutes fraud and falsification
of records.

If overlooked or undetected, he would have received

pay improperly.

The justification for discharge is manifest, and

there is no need to deal with any of the other subsidiary charges.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
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The December 11, 1987 discharge of Leon
Mantoni was for just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: August 22, 1988
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) °
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 1400 International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #52 300306 88

and
Citizens Gas & Coke Utility

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Utility violate the collective
bargaining agreement by discharging
Richard Bentley? If so what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held in Indianapolis, Indiana on September
9, 1988 at which time Mr. Bentley, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and
Utility appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

A stenographic record

of the proceedings was taken, and each side filed a post-hearing
brief.
The grievant was discharged, when, in the opinion of the
Utility, he failed to comply with the terras of a "Last-Chance
Commitment."

That Commitment signed by the grievant on October

5, 1987, with the participation and agreement of the Union, reads
On 9-29-87 at 4:00 A.M., Richard Bentley
#420, entered the Manufacturing facility
during off-duty hours in an unauthorized
vehicle. Mr. Bentley appeared to be under
the influence of alcohol or other substances.
For this reason and past performances, as
a condition of employment Mr. Bentley must:
1] Leave this facility immediately and seek
outside help for his apparent abuse problem.

-22] Must gain permission from George Shell or
his representative before returning to work.
Permission to return to work will be based
on showing proof, on a weekly basis, that he
is following all of the doctor's instructions.
3] Upon returning to work, he will be put on
probation for two years. During this period
of probation he must be a "exemplary" employee
in his work performance and attendance.
4] A failure to satisfy any of the above will
be cause for immediate termination.
There is no dispute over the propriety and effectiveness
of that Commitment.

The grievant's work history prior thereto

had been replete with work rule violations, misconduct, an unsatis
factory attendance record and problems related to alcohol abuse
for which he had received numerous warnings and at least two
suspensions.

The Commitment itself was offered to the grievant

following certain offenses and strange conduct by the grievant on
September 29, at locations in and around the plant, where his
presence was unauthorized.

At this point (with these later of-

fenses) the Utility concluded it had grounds to discharge him.
Apparently however, because the Utility felt that his misconduct
and behavior on and after 3:30 A.M. that morning (four and onehalf hours after he clocked out from his regular shift) were due
to his drinking problem, it decided to afford him a final chance
at rehabilitation instead of dismissal.
Under the foregoing circumstances it cannot be seriously
doubted that the "Last-Chance" agreement was reasonable and amply
related to the facts of the grievant's work record.
I conclude also, that under those circumstances, and
particularly because it was an alternative - and a last chance
alternative - to discharge, the Utility had the right to require
the grievant to comply with its terms strictly.

Indeed, and
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conversely, I find that impliedly but clearly the grievant and
the Union on his behalf, understood that he was to exercise
special care and prudence to specifically comply with each term
of the Commitment.
The grievant failed to meet that duty and expectation.
With regard to attending counseling sessions and submitting weekly reports thereof, he failed to do so in timely
fashion, and in some instances missed scheduled sessions entirely
despite further warnings, proddings
to do so, by/the Utility.

and even extensions of time

The record of his missed sessions and

the delays in submitting reports are adequately documented in the
record, and are not seriously contested.

His explanations - ill-

ness and forgetfulness - and his attitude that he "didn't think
it was that severe that the slips had to be in," are not acceptable
excuses when strict compliance was properly required, and demonstrated an inappropriate and unacceptable cavalier response to a
most serious and demanding

commitment.

Though there is some dispute over the accurateness of his
attendance record following the execution of the Last-Chance
Commitment,

it cannot be persuasively argued that that record was

"exemplary" as required by Section 3 of the Commitment.
It is well settled that a record of chronic absenteeism
and/or tardiness, is grounds for ultimate dismissal even if the
absences and latenesses are due to circumstances beyond the employee's fault or control, like illness.

Here, discounting ex-

cused absences, the grievant's absentee percentage was well in
excess of the average, at a time when he was under a special duty
not just to avoid absences or reduce them to the average, but
rather to maintain a record that was "exemplary."

Indeed, though
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the Union defended the grievant well in this arbitration, and
filed a commendable brief on his behalf, it nonetheless states
in that brief:
"Although his absence record was not exemplary , it certainly wasn't as bad as
the Utility witnesses described it..."
(emphasis added);
admitting thereby that the "exemplary" test was not met.
Finally, in view of the terms and conditions of the LastChance Commitment, I find no requirement that the Utility treat
the grievant's problems and unsatisfactory record as a matter exclusively for the Employee Assistance Program.

That Program, a

laudable approach to deal with employee problems, is not an absolute substitute for discipline.

Here, the grievant was given

ample opportunity for counseling and medical rehabilitation.
failed or was unable to respond to those opportunities.

He

Nothing

remained for him but the "Last-Chance" opportunity, and when he
could not comply with its requirements, discipline in the form of
discharge was proper.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Utility did not violate the collective
bargaining agreement by discharging Richard
Bentley.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: December 27, 1988
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

becitawd
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION. ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

Award of Arbitrator

International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Local 1400

AAA Case
No. 52 30 3069-87

and

Grievance 87-01

Citizens Gas & Coke Utility, Indianapolis,
Indiana

The undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
There was just cause for the discharge of
Ransom Jackson.

EricyJ. Schmertz
Arbitrator

y

Dated: March 31, 1988
STATE of New York )
) ss. :
COUNTY of New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz, do hereby affirm upon my oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my award.

ejsbecit
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION. ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

Arbitrator1s
Opinion

International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Local 1400

AAA Case
No. 52 30 3069-87
Grievance 87-01

and
Citizens Gas & Coke Utility, Indianapolis,
Indiana

This proceeding was instituted and conducted pursuant to the
collective bargaining agreement, executed on July 1, 1985,
between Citizens Gas & Coke Utility (the Company) and Local 1400,
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (the Union).
The proceeding involves the Union's claim that the Company
wrongfully discharged Mr. Ransom Jackson (the Employee) on
January 5, 1987.

A hearing was held before the Arbitrator, Eric

J. Schmertz, on December 17, 1987, at which both sides presented
testimonial and documentary evidence and thereafter submitted
post-hearing briefs.

It was agreed that the stenographic record

would be the official transcript of the proceedings.
The Issue
The parties have agreed that the following is the issue to be
resolved in this proceeding (Hearing, p. 6):
Was there just cause for the discharge of Ransom
Jackson, and if not, what shall be the remedy?

Facts
The Employee was hired by the Company on August 23, 1982,
and discharged on January 5, 1987, on the grounds that he had an
"unacceptable attendance record".

During that period, he was

suspended for performance problems for a period of 388 days
(April 12, 1985, to May 5 1986).

Exclusive of that period of

suspension, he worked for the Company for a total of 36 1/2
months.
During that 36 1/2 month period, he missed a total of 151
hours attributable to sickness (107), tardiness (13) and absence
without permission (21).

In 1982, he missed 8 1/2 hours due to

sickness for one day (8 hours) and 1/2 hour tardiness.

In 1983,

he missed 25 3/4 hours due to one illness, 4 instances of
tardiness and absence without permission on two occasions.

As of

April 15, 1984, he had missed an additional 14 1/4 hours during
that calendar year due to 2 1/2 hours of tardiness and 11 3/4
hours attributable to illness.

There are some minor differences

between the Union and Company figures, but they do not affect the
outcome.
The written warning.
On April 19, 1984, the Company issued a written warning to
the Employee in the presence of the Steward.

The warning stated:

Mr. Jackson is being warned that the above absence
record including excessive tardiness and absence
without permission, is unacceptable.
We will continue
to monitor his absence record and failure to make
satisfactory improvement or any more absence without

permission will be cause for further review and
possible further disciplinary action.
No grievance was filed challenging this warning.

The three days suspension.
On November 30, 1984, received a three-day disciplinary
suspension on the grounds of excessive absences.

-Since the

warning on April 19, 1984, to the time of the suspension on
November 30, the Employee had an additional 11 absences (48 3/4
hours) due to sickness on six occasions (42 hours), tardiness on
four occasions (1 3/4 hours) and absence without permission on
one occasion (5 hours).

The absences included an absence for

sickness just prior to the April 19 warning which was not covred
by that warning and was carried over into the period covered by
the suspension.
The written record of suspension shows that the Employee
received a warning similar to the one he had previously received
with the additional advice that his attendance record was
"unacceptable" and that " failure to make satisfactory
improvement or any more absence without permission will be cause
for further disciplinary action up to and including discharge."
As was the case with the warning, no grievance was filed with
respect to this disciplinary measure.
Counseling.
The Company's records indicate that the Employee received
counseling on December 10, 1984, a few days after he returned to

work after the suspension.

The "summary" of the counseling

session states:
Discussed the absence policy with
is implemented. Explained to him
responsibility to be at work each
his record did not show immediate
be terminated.

Mr. Jackson & how it
that it is his
day on time & that if
improvement he would

Absences after suspension and counseling.
It appears that from the time of his return in December,
1984, after the 3 days suspension, until his previously
referenced 388 days suspension for performance reasons on April
12, 1985, the Employee at most had a 1/2 hour absence in
February, 1985, for tardiness, 1/4 hour for tardiness in March
and one day for illness in April.

He returned to work from the

388 day suspension on May 7, 1986.
Thereafter, from May 7, 1986, until December 15, 1986, when
he was assigned to light duty due to an on-the-job wrist injury,
the Employee had a record of additional absences which occurred
during May 13 to November 11.

His absences during that period

totalled 50.7 hours and involved 16 separate absences for
sickness (6 occasions, 44.2 hours) and tardiness (10 occasions,
6.5 hours).
While assigned to light duty, the Company presented
testimony and documentary evidence that the Employee was late on
several occasions and had to be admonished for disturbing
employees who were on a set schedule of duties.

During that

period, the Employee claimed on at least one occasion that he
failed to clock in because he could not find his time card.
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According to the Company, his time card was where it was supposed
to be, but the supervisor gave him the benefit of any doubt and
only clocked him as having been two minutes late.

The discharge and the grievance.
The Employee's conduct during this light duty assignment
alerted his supervisors that there might be an "absences"
problem, and upon examining the record, they learned that during
the 12 1/2 month period in which the Employee actually worked
after the three days suspension, he had 22 absences for tardiness
and sickness.

The Company decided to discharge him, and on

January 5, 1987,.he was discharged.

The Union grieved the

discharge under the collective bargaining agreement, and after
the company denied the grievance in the first two steps, the
Union demanded arbitration under the terms of the agreement.
The relevant contract provisions and rules.
The collective bargaining agreement reserves to the Company
(except as limited specifically by the agreement) the "exclusive
right to exercise the duties of management, to plan, direct, and
control the working operations and force, including....discharge
for cause..." (par. 2.1).

It also limits the arbitrator to

decisions consistent with the terms of the agreement
(par. 7.2.2) .
Paragraph 7.3.2 of the agreement requires the Company to
"publish Work Rules covering proper cause for disciplinary action
and forms of disciplinary action.

5

[The Company) further agrees

to discuss any additions or amendments to such rules with the
Union's Executive Board prior to effecting any such changes."
The paragraph also provides that disciplinary reports are
returned to the Union two years after they are originated, except
for

"[a]bsence reviews indicating discipline and disciplinary

reports for absenteeism/tardiness [which are to] be returned to
the Union, if for a period of five (5) years since the most
recent" of such reviews and reports concerning absenteeism, the
employee has maintained a clean record with respect to
absenteeism.
Work Rules were published, effective October 1, 1970, and
»

revised

as of November 15, 1971.

The published Work Rules, in

relevant part, provide that "being repeatedly absent or tardy"
"will constitute proper cause for disciplinary action" (Art. I,
par. 12).

Article III of the Work Rules provides for warnings,

suspension and discharge.
Through 1975, there were several memoranda developed by and
issued to management personnel concerning Work Rules enforcement
policy.

They dealt with guidelines for flagging employees who

presented an absenteeism problem and for keeping appropriate
records to enable such employees to be recognized by managemnet.
It does not appear that these memoranda were discussed with the
Union prior to adoption by management and they were not
distributed to employees.

However, there was evidence that new

employees were advised of the Company's strict approach to
absenteeism and this was frequently reinforced at meetings with

employees.

Moreover, the Union appeared to be familiar with

Company policy regarding absenteeism.
The Contentions of the Parties and Discussion
The Union's contention concerning the memoranda.
The Union has claimed that the adoption of the memoranda
violated the collective bargaining agreement provision which
require consultation with the Union prior to adding to or
amending the Work Rules.

However, the memoranda did not take the

form of "additions or amendments" to the Work Rules, and I do not
find on the basis of this record that, in substance, they were
amendments or additions.
The quoted Work Rules are stated in very general terms
which did not meet with objection from the Union.

The memoranda

appear to be guidelines for management implementation of those
very general Work Rules.

There appears to have been no objection

by the Union to the memoranda after it became aware of their
content.

Moreover, since the generation of the memoranda, no

changes in the collective bargaining agreement concerning
absenteeism were negotiated, except that, in 1985, the
requirement was added that absences review and disciplinary
documents relating to absenteeism be returned to the Union after
five years, where there had been no previous time limit with
respect to absence reviews.
I find that on the basis of this record that the conduct of
the Company and the response of the Union to the memoranda

reflected their mutual understanding that the Company had the
power to use the memorandum method to instruct management
personnel on how the Company wished to implement the Work Rules,
and the memoranda do not constitute additions or amendments to
the Work Rules within the meaning of the agreement.
The claim of disparate treatment.
The Union claims that the Employee was subjected to
disparate treatment when compared with similarly situated
employees.
heading.

The Union launched a two-pronged attack under this
It relied on the manner in which other employees were

treated in comparison with Mr. Jackson and urged that in the
absence of more specific limitations on Company power the system
of discipline is inherently one in which there will be disparate
treatment.
Turning to the last point first, the short answer to the
Union's position is that the collective bargaining agreement does
not require that the Work Rules establish specific numbers with
respect to absences as a condition for imposing discipline for
excessive absenteeism and tardiness.

The rules and the

agreement necessarily contemplate the exercise of discretion
based on relevant facts.

One key relevant fact established by

the record is that the Company has established a "no-fault"
absenteeism policy based on the Company's assessment of
managerial needs.

This is not an arbitrary or capricious

conclusion by management based this record, and in any event, it
is clearly within its power to do so.
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However, no matter what

the absenteeism policy may be, it cannot be implemented in a
disparate manner.

This means simply that employees in the same

situation should not be treated differently.
The Union and the Company submitted the records of employees
as a basis for comparison and contrast with the treatment
accorded Mr. Ransom Jackson.

The Company notes that the

employees' records relied on by the Union are distinguishable
from Mr. Jackson's in that they were employees whose employment
began before Mr. Jackson, they did not immediately compile a
record of excessive absenteeism, and in some instances, the
disciplinary process was different at the time those persons were
•

disciplined, there having been a change in 1981/82, before
Jackson was hired.

On the other hand, the Company presented

records of employees disciplined during the same time period as
Mr. Jackson and based on the record, there is no evidence of
disparate treatment when those records are compared with Mr.
Jackson's.

In summary, they show:
Sickness

Employee

Mos. Worked

Hrs. Occasions

Tardy

AWOL

Hrs. Occ.

Hrs.
21.

3

39.5

7

Jackson

36

107.25

15

13.

B

33

736.0

11

3.25

5

D

33

135.5

10

6.0

10

10.25

2

S

37

4

12.5

17

56.25

8

24.25

26

Occ.

Conclusion
The Company did not abuse its discretion in discharging
Mr. Jackson on the basis of excessive absenteeism.

9

He was

subjected to progressive discipline which was not grieved until
he was discharged.

His absenteeism, although attributable, mostly

to claims of illness in terms of hours, when measured in terms of
occasions, tardiness and AWOL outnumbers sickness by practically
2-1.

Moreover, the record shows that many of the days attributed

to illness were either before or after a two day weekend.

There

was ample cause for the Company to discharge Mr. Jackson for
excessive absenteeism.

Moreover, there was a failure to

establish that imposition of this penalty on Mr. Jackson resulted
in Mr. Jackson being treated in a materially different manner
than other similarly situated employees.

Consequently, the claim

of disparate treatment fails.
Based on the foregoing, I conclude that the Company had just
cause for discharging Mr. Ransom Jackson.

March 31, 1988
ERIC J/ SCHMERTZ,
Arbitrator
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Utility Workers Union of America

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1930 0194 87

and
Connecticut-American Water Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was discontinuation of the scheduled monthly
overtime for relief operators in April 1987
a violation of the collective bargaining agreement? If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association in White Plains, New York, on March 2, 1988 at
which time representatives of the above-named Union and Company
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The determinative question is whether the relief operators
are shift employees or non-shift.

The Company takes the position

that, past practice notwithstanding, the relief operators are
non-shift employees under the third paragraph of Section II Work
Week of the contract.
The first three paragraphs of Section II, which I deem relevant in this case read:
The work week for shift employees covered by
subsection A of this Section shall commence
on Monday and end on the following Sunday.
Such employees shall during each four (4) week
period be scheduled to work three (3) weeks of
five (5) 8-hour days and one (1) week of six
(6) 8-hour days.
The work week for Maintenance Men, Relief Operator - Helpter and for Helper shall commence on
Monday and end on the following Sunday. Such
employees shall be scheduled to work five (5)
8-hour days between Monday and Friday, inclusive,
except that one (1) week each month they shall be

-2scheduled to work six (6) 8-hour days between
Monday and Saturday, inclusive.
The work week for all other non-shift employees
covered by subsection A of this Section shall
commence on Monday and end on the following
Sunday.
Such employees shall be scheduled to
work five (5) 8-hour days between Monday and
Friday, inclusive.
The Company argues that because the relief operators work
about 75% of their time on maintenance work which is a non-shift
work assignment, they are not "shift employees" within the meaning and coverage of the first paragraph.

And, because they are

not classified as Maintenance Men, Relief Operators - Helper
(conceeded not the relief operator involved in this proceeding),
or as Helpers, the second paragraph is inapplicable to them.
The Company concludes that as the only remaining classification not referred to or covered by the first two paragraphs, the
relief operators must perforce be covered by the third paragraph,
as "non-shift employees," otherwise the third paragraph would have
no meaning or reason to be in the contract.
On this basis, the Company concluded that it was contractually erroneous to schedule the relief operators to work an average of 42 hours a week each month and to be paid a "guarantee"
of wages in that amount, (i.e. they had been scheduled to work
40 hours for three weeks, and 48 hours the fourth week, averaging
42 hours a week over each month), and, in April 1987 changed their
work schedules and pay to that of a regular 40 hour week.
I agree with the Company, with Arbitrator Benewitz and with
the well settled rule that clear and unambiguous contract language
pre-empts any practice that is different or contrary.

And that

under that circumstance an employer has the right to unilaterally
end the practice and require adherence to the contract language.
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However, in the instant case, I do not find the contract
language to be as clear or unambiguous
or as is required to invoke that rule.
relief operator is a "hybrid."

as the Company asserts,
The fact is that the

He works on maintenance duties

about 75% of his time, but, as his job title suggests, relieves
shift operators and assistant operators when they are absent.
There is no dispute that during the time the relief operator relieves an operator or assistant operator he adopts the operator's
or assistant's work schedule.

That schedule is a shift schedule,

and during the period of any such relief, the relief operators
are paid wages as shift employees.

So for some of his working

time, he is a "shift employee" within the meaning and application
of the first paragraph above.
At other times, i.e. the 75% of his time that he performs
maintenance duties, he works a regular set of hours, and in that
latter respect, he is a "non-shift

employee."

Hence his hybrid

status.
I find nothing in the foregoing contract provisions, or in
the contract generally, which define whether a "hybrid" status is
"shift" or "non-shift."

Indeed, it can be argued either way.

The relief operators are shift employees because they work the
shifts of operators and assistant operators when they relieve them
or are "non-shift" employees because they perform
maintenance duties.
ambiguity.

"non-shift"

Therein lies what I view to be a manifest

Obviously, if they are deemed to be "shift" employees,

they would be covered by the first paragraph, and the Company woul
have erred in reducing their work week and pay.

And if covered by

the first paragraph, they are excluded from the third paragraph.
Absent an express provision including the relief operator
(by name or classification) in the third paragraph, and considering
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the "hybrid" nature of the classification, I am not prepared to
conclude that the third paragraph covers them.

And that is so,

to my mind, even if there may be no other use of or explanation
for the presence of the third paragraph in the contract.
In short, the determinative contract sections are unclear
and susceptible to different and divergent interpretations.

That

being so, the rule for interpretation and meaning is also well
settled.

The arbitrator looks to past practice to determine what

the parties meant and intended, and the practice, if sufficient,
becomes contractually enforceable.
Here, the past practice is undisputed and supports the
Union's case.

It was stipulated that from 1959 to 1987 the relief

operators worked and were paid for Saturday overtime (i.e. an
average 42 hour workweek).

It was also stipulated that up until

April 1987, the job postings for relief operators listed the working hours as 42, and that those postings were consistent with the
first stipulation on the Saturday overtime.
These stipulations are undisputed evidence of a long standing practice to schedule work for and pay the relief operators as
"shift employees" under the first paragraph of Section II.

This

practice obtained each month, whether or not the relief operators
worked on maintenance duties or in relief of operators and assistant operators.

This unvaried and extensive past practice serves

to clarify the ambiguities of Section II regarding the work schedule and pay guaranties of relief operators.
As the other argument in this case would not change the foregoing holdings, I need not recite or review them herein.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and havin
been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
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The discontinuation of the scheduled monthly
overtime for relief operators in April 1987
violated the collective bargaining agreement,
The affected relief operators shall be made
whole for wages lost, and the Company shall
restore their scheduled monthly overtime.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 7, 1988
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) s s > :
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
, i

Kv %

\

International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, AFL-CIO, Local Lodge
No. 645

OPINION

AND

AWARD

Chicago Pneumatic Tool Company
The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the disposition of grievances
dated May 27, 1986 and September 8, 1986
A hearing was held at the Company offices in Utica, New
York on January 6, 1988 at which time representatives of the
above-named Union and Company appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

In both grievances the Union complains about the Company's
order requiring employees not classified as Runner/Laborers to
perform clean-up work at or around their work areas.

The Union

contends that the clean-up work belongs to employees in the
Runner/Laborer classification and that its assignment to others
infringes on that job classification and prejudices the job
security of employees in that classification.
Absent a jointly agreed to issue covering the general
circumstances in dispute and absent any joint request for a
declaratory judgment on the right or lack of right of the Company
to assign employees of all or different classifications to do
clean-up work, I am confined to the grievances submitted and to
the particular facts of those grievances.
Hence my findings and Award shall obtain only to those
particular circumstances and to circumstances similar thereto.
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On that basis, the grievance of May 27, 1986 is granted
and the grievance of September 8, 1986 is denied.
Let me deal with the latter first.

It arose from the

Company's direction that all employees clean up around their work
areas on the date involved to make the plant presentable to visiting representatives of a prospective buyer.
The record shows that the Company had very short notice
of the visit (i.e. the day before) and that the plant was especially untidy and uncleaned just prior to that visit.

I find

that the Company did not have enough notice to effectuate the
clean-up in any way other than to have all the employees work
at it.

I also conclude that the Company's effort in this regard

was beneficial to it, to the continued job security of the employees and to the continued representation rights of the Union.
For, as it turned out, the Company was purchased.

New funds pro-

vided by the new owner were infused into the plant, and the Company's future was made more secure.

Under those special circum-

stances I think the Company's action for that single or noncontinuing circumstance, and under what bordered on an emergency
need, was a reasonable exercise of its managerial authority, and
is therefore sustained.
/
The grievance of May 27, 1986 however is different.

For

several months employees classified as Clerk-Stock Selectors were
(and may still be) required to sweep and clean-up the narrow
aisles adjacent to and between the stock bins where they work.
The Union claims that by practice and by job description
this sweeping and cleaning had been done by Runner/Sweepers; that
a large scale layoff of Runner/Sweepers left the Company

short
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handed

prompting' the assignment of those duties to the Clerk-

Stock Selectors.

It asserts that there was enough sweeping and

cleaning of aisles to make up a full days work for a Runner/
Sweeper and that by denying that classification the assignment
(even if a recall was necessary) violated the recall rights of
those employees and damaged that classification.
The Company contends that by long standing practice,
employees have been required to and have cleaned up their work
areas including floors and aisles; that the "cleanliness" and
"good housekeeping and cleanliness" provisions of the Company's
Safety Code Manual and Employee's Guide Book support

that posi-

tion; that the merit wage increases granted the particular grievants in this case included consideration of how clean they kept
their work areas (implying a responsibility for that cleaning);
that under common industrial practice employees are expected to
and do "clean up the mess they make;" and that the requirement
to do so is a proper exercise of management's rights.
The facts of this grievance are not consistent with the
Company's arguments.

By practice, the Clerk-Stock Selectors have

not cleaned the narrow aisles by their bins as a regular part of
their duties.

What one or more of them did, if anything, was

voluntary and casual.

The regular

cleaning had been done by the

Runner/Sweepers and by the operator of the sweeping machine.
The practice the Company relies on is and has been the
practice in machine shop areas and has been confined to machine
operators.

They have cleaned scrap metal chips and shavings from

their machines, work benches and the floor immediately surrounding their machine.

I agree with the Company that that type of

clean-up by machine operators is common in machine shops.

But

-4that type of clean-up is logically related to the nature of
machine work, and can be reasonably expected of machine operators.
But it is not a practice which establishes a precedent for the non
machine operator Clerk-Stock Selectors, especially when the latter
group has not done it before on a regular basis and where the nature of the work does not create the scrap and debris attendant to
the operations of grinding, milling, cutting and drilling machines
In machine work we are talking of the very byproduct of the
operator's production; for the Clerk-Stock Selectors we are talking of paper and cigarette butts which are not an inevitable conseuqnece of the job duties of the Clerk and which may or may not
have been left or deposited by the Clerk.
So, in short, the "practice" relied on by the Company is
inappropriate to the Clerks, and does not support the new and extended requirements that Clerks sweep and clean up the aisles.
I do not interpret the "cleanliness" sections of the
Safety Code and Guide Book to establish a job duty of clean-up for
the grievants in this grievance.
health" purposes.

The Code is for "safety and

The Guide Book is a "guide."

They state gen-

eralized propositions about the importance of cleanliness in the
plant.

But they do not establish job classifications or job

descriptions.

The "expectations" that employees "do (their) part

in maintaining a clean plant," cannot serve to extend the specific
clean-up duties of one classification (Runner/Sweeper) to other
classifications whose job descriptions do not include those duties
The Code and Guide are commendable instructions but they do not
mandate work assignments.
Indeed, in this regard, the job descriptions are preeminent.

The job description of Runner/Sweeper (a classification

that combined the jobs of Runner and Laborer) provided for (as
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part of the original Laborer function) "cleaning of work places
and other areas...

Sweep floors... remove rubbish."

Additionally, I find that the job descriptions prevail
over the general consideration of "cleanliness"
rating plan.

in the merit

Obviously it is one thing to consider an employee's

neatness and the cleanliness of his work area as one (and a minor
one) of the ingredients in merit

pay increases and something quite

different to graft a clean-up work assignment on his set of job
duties, not previously required.

The Clerk-Stock

Selector job

description ( or the separate predecessor jobs combined into that
classification) make no mention of "clean-up" as a regular and
expected duty.
Finally, the Company's argument that it is a well accepted
and common industrial

practice for employees to be required to

"clean-up their own mess," is inapplicable here.

My tour of the

work areas involved, with representatives of both sides, disclosed
that the grievant in this grievance was required to sweep and
clean aisles in an area in which he did not work.

His regular

work duties covered stock binds and aisles in a location different
from the aisles he was assigned to clean.

So what he was required

to clean-up was not "his mess."
For all the foregoing reasons I find that the clean-up
work assigned the Clerk-Stock Selector was not part of his job
duties.

Absent the agreement of the Union, such assignment be-

longed to an employee in the Runner/Laborer classification.

The

Union's grievance and the remedy it seeks, are granted.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
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The Union's grievance dated September
8, 1986 is denied.
The Union's grievance dated May 27,
1986 is granted. The Company shall
cease and desist from requiring ClerkStock Selectors to perform the particular clean-up work involved. That work
is to be assigned to the Runner/Laborer
classification.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: January 21, 1988
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 584 I.B.T.

and

OPINION AND AWARD
(Clerical Employees)
Case No. 1330 079 88

The Dannon Company, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Under the collective bargaining agreement dated
April 1, 1986 through April 1, 1991, what if any
would be the appropriate changes in wages and
pension benefits for Clerical Employees to be
effective April 1, 1988 and for the balance of
the contract?
A hearing was held on October 5, 1988 at which time representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.
hearing

The parties filed post-

statements.

Mr. Ross Houser, who testified for the Company, stated that
the clerical group consists of six (6) employees encompassing
diverse skills.

From Company Exhibit A, it can be seen that these

employees support either the sales staff or the administrative
personnel.
Mr. Houser, who is the plant manager at the Ridgefield facility, stated that a 5% per year increase over the next three
(3) years was budgeted for all classifications.

However, due to

a wage disparity existing within the clerical group, he suggested
that two (2) employees, Linda Mychajluk and Terri Giovannone,
would be entitled to additional wage increases.
Based upon my analysis of the testimony and the briefs of
the parties, I conclude that annual increases of $20.00 per year

-2are proper and that, in addition, Linda Mychajluk be awarded a
further adjustment of $20.00 per week effective April 1, 1988
and a further adjustment of $20.00 per week effective April 1,
1989, and that Terri Giovannone be awarded a further adjustment
of $20.00 per week effective April 1, 1988.

Hence, all new em-

ployee's weekly and hourly rates would be as follows:
Effective
April 1, 1988
Names
Weekly/Hourly
Linda Mychajluk $320.34 ( 9.15)
Terri Giovannone $439.42 (12.55)
Rose Mastromauro $429.03 (12.26)
Barbara Mosher
$269.38 ( 7.69)
Marie Mundy
$394.23 (11.26
Amy Tracy
$397.30 (11.35)

Effective
April 1, 1989
Weekly/Hourly
$360.34 (10.29)
$459.42 (13.13)
$449.03 (12.83)
$289.38 ( 8.26)
$414.23 (11.84)
$417.30 (11.92)

Effective
April 1, 1990
Weekly/Hourly
$380.34 (10.87)
$479.42 (13.70)
$469.03 (13.40)
$309.38 ( 8.84)
$434.23 (12.41)
$437.30 (12.49)

A W A R D
The clerical employees shall receive wage increases as
follows:

$20.00 per week, effective April 1, 1988; $20.00 per

week, effective April 1, 1989; $20.00 per week, effective April
1, 1990.

In addition, two (2) clerical employees will be entitled

to wage increases as follows:

Linda Mychajluk - $20.00 per week,

effective April 1, 1988 and $20.00 per week, effective April 1,
1989; Terri Giovannone - $20.00 per week, effective April 1,1988.
There shall be no changes in the pension benefits.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: December 27, 1988
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Board of Education of Eastchester
Union Free School District

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #19 39 0229 87

and
Eastchester Teachers' Association

The issue to be decided first is:
Is the Association's grievance of May 5, 1987
arbitrable?
Hearings were held on June 6 and July 6, 1988 at which time representatives of the above-named parties, hereinafter referred to respectively as the
"District" or "Board" and the "Association" appeared. All concerned were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses, The District and the Association filed post-hearing
briefs on the arbitrability issue. The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
On at least two grounds, the District claims that the grievance is time
barred from arbitration.

Determinative, in my view, are the time limits and

requirements of Article VI (Grievance Procedure) Section E paragraph 1 of the
collective bargaining agreement.

It reads:

1. If the Association is not satisfied with the decision
of the Board, the grievance may be submitted to arbitration under the rules and procedures of the American Arbitration Association, provided, however, that the arbitration proceeding must be instituted within thirty days after receipt of the written decision of the Board by the
Association, or if no written decision is rendered, within forty-five days after the meeting with the Board or its
committee.
For me to find the grievance arbitrable, I would have to conclude that
the references to "thirty days: and "forty-five days" mean or are intended to
mean "thirty school days" and "forty-five school days," and that the Board
did not give the Association

a "written decision" within the meaning of that

provision of the contract.
To find that the above referred to time limits really mean "school days"
is logically possible. Other time limits in the contract use "school days," so

-2that it may have been a ministerial oversight not to correspond the grievance
and arbitration time limits to the others. At least, absent evidence of
legislative history, the critical time limits, when viewed with the other time
constraints

in the contract, could be logically deemed ambiguous, and there-

fore insufficient as a bar to the arbitration of the grievance on the merits.
But that would make the Association' s grievance arbitrable only if the
latter part of Section E applied, namely, the provision that the "arbitration
proceedings must be instituted...if no written decision is rendered, within
forty-five days after the meeting with Board or its committee."
Here, assuming the forty-five day limit means "school days" the Association's grievance was filed for arbitration with the American Arbitration
Association, on October 28, 1987, just forty-five school days after the meeting
with the Board on June 15, 1987.
But, assuming arguendo, that I hold contrary to customary contract
language, that "forty-five days" did not mean calendar days but rather "school
days," I find no basis upon which I could reasonably or logically conclude
that that part of Section E applied in this case. Rather, the facts establish
that following the Board meeting of June 15, 1987, the Superintendent of
Schools wrote the Chairman of the Association's grievance committee that the
Board
"found little merit to your presentation on the 'Bahret'
grievance. Therefore ... grievance(s) were denied."
Absent evidence of practice or agreement, it would be stretching the
contract interpretation too far, with inappropriate distortions as a result,
if I held not only that "forty-five days" meant "forty-five school days" and
that the Board's letter of June 25, 1987 was not a "written decision" within
the meaning of Section E.
Though the Association found that letter to be an unsatisfactory answer
to its grievance, and though it felt that it should have "reasons" for the
denial of the grievance, I cannot conclude that it did not meet the contract
agreement of a "written decision," nor could I conclude that the statement that
the Board "found little merit" in the presentation of the Bahret grievance, was
not a reason for the denial.
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That being so, the applicable part of Section E is the "thirty day" time
limit for instituting the arbitration following receipt by the Association of
the written decision. Obviously that thirty day limit, whether thirty calendar
days or thirty school days was not met. If, as the Association argues, it
filed the grievance for arbitration on the forty-fifth school day, it did not,
under any theory meet the "thirty day" limit following the written decision.
The parties are reminded that the arbitrator is bound by the contract
that the parties negotiated and wrote. The parties, not the arbitrator, used
the word "must" in Section E, with regard to the time limits therein, making
those limits mandatory and statutes of limitation. There is no evidence of a
waiver of the time limits in this case or evidence of a disregard of time
limits as a practice. Also, the case law is well settled that arbitrability
may be raised for the first time when the grievance is ripe for arbitration.
The Board did so in the instant case.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Association's grievance of May 5, 1987
("Bahret") is not arbitrable.

DATED: September 14, 1988
STATE OF New York )„„ .
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator that I
am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my
AWARD.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-X
GEORGIANA JOHNSON, et al. ,

SPECIAL MASTER
ERIC J. SCHMERTZ

Plaintiffs,
-versus-

87 Civ. 6482 (RWS)

EDWARD KAY, et al.,
Defendants.

I.

The Court's Order of October 9, 1987

In the course of this action between two groups competing
for control of a Union local (Local 1199),

the Court rendered an

opinion with findings and conclusions on October 8, 1987, and on
Ocotber 9, 1987, it issued an Order and Preliminary Injunction
which plaintiffs claim defendants violated.

The order enjoined

a Union election for the purpose of approving or disapproving
proposed amendments to the Union's constitution from being held,
as originally scheduled, on October 13 through October 17, 1987,
and rescheduled the election for October 28 through November 3,
1987.
The Order also limited the parties' conduct with respect to
the election, as follows:
(1) prior to and during the week of October 13, 1987,
Local 1199 President Georgiana Johnson ...[was]
entitled to prepare and mail a document expressing her
views regarding the proposed amendments to each member
of Local 1199 in accordance with the terms of this
Court's order of September 25, 1987[;]
(2) during the week of October 19, 1987, the parties

1

...[were] entitled to prepare and mail a document to
the members of Local 1199 at union expense such as is
described in this court's Opinion of October 8, 1987,
granting each party reasonably equivalent space and
format;
(3) the foregoing mailings ...[were to] be the sole
means of communication by the parties, or those acting
in concert with them, with the Local 1199 membership
regarding the proposed amendments that employ[ed] any
union facilities, resources, or personnel; [and]
(4) there ...[was to] be no campaigning by paid staff
members of Local 1199 on time that is paid for by the
union***
The Court further ordered that disputes concerning the order and
claims of violations first be reported to and heard by the
Special Master.
II. The Civil Contempt Claim
The rescheduled election was held and the proposed
amendments were approved.

Plaintiffs, who opposed approval,

claim that the defendants violated the order in several respects
and instituted this proceeding charging defendants with civil
contempt.

As a remedy they seek to have the election and its

results nullified.
A.

Plaintiff's factual allegations.
The allegations of the claimed contempt are contained in an

affidavit, dated March 10, 1988, by Georgiana Johnson, one of the
plaintiffs in this action.
(1)

She alleged:

Defendants caused 75,000 copies of a brochure

("Fraud Exposed") paid for with Union funds to be mailed to Union
members "on or about October 28" (Affidavit, par. 1);

(2)

Defendants caused paid Union employees to

distribute an additional 35,000 copies of the brochure
"subsequent to October 25, 1987" (Affidavit, par. 2);
(3)

Defendants, acting through an organization called

"Save Our Union", using Union "credit and resources":
(a)

caused to be printed and mailed to Union

members, 12,500 flyers on October 12, 1987, 12,500 flyers on
October 30, 1987, and 15,000 postcards on November 2, 1987
(Affidavit, par. 3, 4 and 5);
(b)

on November 2, 1987, caused to be printed and

distributed to Union members 20,000 copies of an advertisement in
the Amsterdam News and 30,000 copies of "vote yes" cards
(Affidavit, par. 6 and 7);
(c)

"on or about October 29, 1987 or thereafter",

caused to be produced and distributed to Union members 15,000
"vote yes" buttons (Affidavit, par. 8); and
(d)

ran advertisements in the Amsterdam News and the

City Sun (no date alleged) (Affidavit, par. 9 and 10);
(4)

acting through "Save Our Union", defendants used Local

1199 mailing labels supplied by Standard Data Inc. and a Local
1199 mailing list to mail materials to members of Local 1199 on
October 22, 29 and November 2, 1987" and (without an allegation
of the time the conduct took place) mailed materials to Johnson
(Affidavit, par. 11 and 12); and
(5)

"On October 30, 1987, Local 1199 employee Eric Eidus

distributed materials at St. Luke's Hospital which were received

by Local 1199 members, Virginia Canty and Vernyce Porter.

In

addition to other materials, Eric Eudus [sic] distributed several
hundred copies of the brochure "Fraud Exposed" produced by
Philmark Lithogrpahers for the Union***" (Affidavit, par. 13).
B.

The of the terms of the Order allegedly violated.
Some of plaintiffs' allegations can be read as charging a

violation of paragraph (4) of the Order that there be "no
campaigning by paid staff members of Local 1199 on time that is
paid for by the Union", but the substance of plaintiffs' charges
is that defendants violated paragraph (3) of the Order.
Paragraph (3) of the Court's October 9, 1987 Order limited the
parties' use of Union facilities and resources when communicating
with members of Local 1199 to the mailings described in
paragraph (2) of the order.

Thus, according to the plaintiffs,

instead of complying with the Court's order that the mailing
during the week of

October 19, 1987

(3) *** shall be the sole means of communication by the
parties, or those acting in concert with them, with the
Local 1199 membership regarding the proposed amendments
that employ any union facilities, resources, or
personnel[,]
the defendants "employ[ed] union facilities, resources, or
personnel" with respect to "means of communication...with Local
1199 membership regarding the proposed amendments" other than
those described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of the Order.

III.

The Evidence, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

A hearing on the allegations was held over several days, and
4

after the plaintiffs completed their case in support of a finding
of civil contempt in the form of sworn testimony and documents,
the defendants moved to dismiss and deny the contempt motion.
The plaintiffs must establish that defendants violated the order
and committed a civil contempt by clear and convincing evidence,
"and a bare prepoderance of the evidence will not suffice".
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: sec. 2960, p.
591.
1. The allegation concerning the mailing on October 28, 1987
(Affidavit, par. 1).
oral argument

It was conceded by defendants' counsel in

that brochures ("Save Our Union") were mailed to

Union members at Union expense on behalf of defendants' on
October 28, 1987.

Paragraph (2) of the Order restricted such

mailings to the "week of October 19, 1988" which would mean that,
under paragraph (3) of the Order, the last permissible day for a
mailing paid for by the Union would have been October 26, 1987.
The reason for the late mailing was provided by the printer,
a witness called by plaintiff.

The mailing would have been

within the allotted time except that an error was discovered in
the first run of the brochures which necessitated reprinting the
brochures with the consequent delay in mailing.

It also appears

that defendants advised plaintiffs and the Court of the problem
and that the mailing would be late.
defendants to plaintiffs' advice.

There was no response by
It is doubtful that this

evidence supports a finding that the Order was violated, and in
any event, it does not support a finding that if there was a

violation it constituted a civil contempt.

The evidence of

record portrays a good-faith effort to reasonably accomplish what
the Court ordered.

At most, there was a technical violation of

its terms despite defendants' efforts to comply.

There is no

basis to believe that the delay was deliberate or that the
lateness of the mailing had any effect on the election or that
defendants were damaged.
minimus.

If there was an effect, it was de

Therefore, I find that although there was a mailing of

brochures on October 28, 1987, the mailing involved substantial
and good-faith compliance with the Court's order.
2. The allegation concerning Mr. Eidis and the meeting at St.
Luke's Hospital (Affidavit, par. 13).

The plaintiff presented

evidence that on October 30 at a meeting of the Union local
scheduled to be held at St, Luke's

Hospital, Eric Eidis [or

Eudis (Eitis in the transcript)], was present.

In addition,

there was a stack of "vote yes" ??? cards on the table before the
meeting began.

Two Union members testified that Eidis was

present and that he was a Union organizer.

They also testified

that he said he was there to urge them to vote "yes" on the
propositions to amend the Union constitution.

The Union members

could not say with certainty that more than four members
(including themselves) were present.

They also testified that

when Eidis was told to leave before the meeting that he did so
and took the materials with him.

The witnesses recalled that

Eidis told them that he was on vacation at the time they saw him
and it appears that they conceded on an earlier occasion, they

might have made this statement in writing.
Apparently honoring a prior stipulation between the parties
(or for other, but not apparent, reasons), plaintiffs' counsel
stipulated that plaintiffs were "not introducing [the foregoing
evidence] to prove any kind of staff campaigning."

(Hearing

transcipt, April 26, 1988, p. 19). The only other relevance of
this testimony would be to establish the defendants' use of
Union resources to communicate with the membership after the
deadline established by paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Order.
However, the record contains no evidence that at the time Eitis
was present at the October 30 meeting that he was acting on
behalf of the defendants or that he was being paid by the Union
for the time involved.

Indeed, the evidence on this point is

that he was on vacation, i.e., Eidis1 statement—hearsay to be
sure—elicited from plaintiffs' witness by defendants' counsel on
cross-examination and subjected to neither objection nor a motion
to strike by the plaintiffs.

(Ibid, pp. 46-7).

In sum, the

foregoing does not constitute clear and convincing evidence that
the Court's Order was violated, and indeed, the affirmative
evidence that Eidis was on vacation strongly tends to rebut the
claim of violation.

Therefore, I find that there is not clear

and convincing evidence that defendants violated the terms of the
order as alleged in paragraph (2) of the affidavit.
3. The remaining allegations.
Evidence in support of the remaining allegations is either
weak and ambiguous, at best, or non-existent in the record.

With

respect to each of the remaining allegations, I find that there
is not clear and convincing evidence that defendants violated the
terms of the Order as alleged in the remaining paragraphs of the
affidavit.
(a) The claim in paragraph (2) of the affidavit concerning
the distribution by Union employees of 35.000 pieces of
literature.

There is no evidence that 35,000 pieces were

distributed by anyone, and to the extent there is some evidence
that a small amount was available to the membership beyond the
October 28 mailing, there is no evidence that it was distributed
by defendants using Union resources.
(b) The claims in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the affidavit
concerning the use of Union resources to print and mail
additional literature and in paragraphs 11 and 12 concerning the
alleged use of Union mailing lists and labels to distribute
defendants' literature.

There is no evidence in the record that

Union resources were utilized and, in fact, the record shows the
mailing permit used to mail the items in question was different
than the one used to mail those items for which the Order
permitted the use of Union resources.

The permittee of the

different mailing permits was never identified in the record.
The record was totally devoid of evidence concerning the
prohibited use of Union labels on mailings.
(c) The claim that in paragraph 8 that defendants' used
Union resources to produce and distribute buttons.

The

allegation claims that this occurred on or after October 29,

8

1987.

There apparently were three button orders placed and only

one was on or after October 29.

There is no evidence as to who

placed the order and whether the Union paid for it.
manufacturer's records are unclear.

The

There is similarly ambiguous

evidence concerning the orders placed before October 29.

There

was no attempt to introduce Union records on this (or any other
issue) and no witnesses were called who could have testified with
respect to the transactions.

As with the claims described in (a)

and (b), plaintiffs simply did not produce evidence with respect
to the key elements of their claim—evidence tying the defendants
to the transactions and evidence concerning who made payments.
(d) claims in paragraphs 9 and 10 concerning newspaper
advertisements.

These allegations involve advertisements in the

City Sun and the Amsterdam News.

There is no evidence in the

record with respect to the placement and payment for the
advertisement allegedly appearing in the City Sun. Plaintiff
offered a copy of the Sun advertisement, but having failed to
comply with discovery requirements by producing the advertisement
in advance of the proceeding, his offer was rejected subject to
being renewed after defendants were afforded discovery
opportunities.

The offer in evidence of the advertisement was

never renewed and no other evidence on the subject, i.e., who
placed it and who paid for it, was addressed by plaintiffs'
evidence.
As for the Amsterdam News, one part of a flyer concerning
that newspaper was received in evidence, but what appears to be

an advertisement placed by "1199 Officers, Staff, Delegates and
Members to Save Our Union" was not received because of
plaintiffs' failure to comply with notice and discovery
requirements.

Here, too, plaintiffs presented no evidence

concerning payment for the adverisement and there was no evidence
in the record concerning who placed the advertisement.
4. Conclusions.

The only failure to comply with the terms of

the Order established by the evidence is the mailing of the
pieces of literature on March 28, as alleged in paragraph 1 of
the affidavit, and discussed at length above.

I find that this

failure to comply did not constitute a civil contempt because it
was at most a technical violation which occurred despite the
good-faith efforts of the defendants to comply with the terms of
the Order.

Moreover, the likely effect of the failure to comply

on the election was de minimus.
Plaintiffs' had the evidentiary burden to establish its
allegations by "clear and convincing evidence".
it has not done so.

It is clear that

The evidence presented was wholly

insufficient for the purpose and there was a failure to explore
important evidentiary avenues which clearly were relevant and to
which plaintiffs had access.

Based on the foregoing, the

defendants' motion to dismiss should be and is granted and
plaintiffs' motion to hold defendants in contempt should be and
is denied.
May 6,1988
ERl£ J. SCHMERTZ
Special Master
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OCAW, Local 8-406
and

OPINION AND AWARD
Case No. 88-15382

IMTT - Bayonne

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the collective bargaining agreement by assigning workers not classified as Plantmen C to work as pier B Dockmen?
If so, what shall be the remedy?
It was stipulated that the classifications Plantmen C and
Dockmen are synonymous.
A hearing was held at the offices of the New Jersey State
Board of Mediation on September 28, 1988 at which time representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

waived.
The critical question is whether the Company may contractually man Pier B differently than it mans its other piers.
On its other piers, when more Dockmen than are working a
particular shift are needed, the Company offers overtime work to
Dockmen scheduled on other shifts and calls them in or holds them
over from a different or previous shift to meet the work needs.
Only if no such Dockmen respond affirmatively does the Company
assign the extra work to Fieldmen or others in classifications
different from the dockrnan' s job.
On pier B, when extra workers are needed beyond the regular

-2complement of Dockmen assigned on that shift to pier B, the Company

offers the extra work only to Dockmen working that shift

on other piers, at regular pay.

It does not call-in or hold over

Dockmen scheduled on different shifts.

And if not enough addi-

tional Dockmen are available on other piers, and on the shift involved, the Company calls on Fieldmen or workers of other classifications and temporarily transfers them from their original
assignments on that shift to pier B.

It is conceded that by doing

so, the Company substantially avoids overtime pay in the manning
of pier B.
The Union's case is basically the assertion that the Company's practices on all piers but pier B require it to follow
that practice on pier B, and that the Company's contractual

right

to make temporary transfers has been narrowed and constrained by
that practice.
As sympathetic as one might be to the equities of the Union'
case, the contract does not support a ruling in its favor.
It is clear that there is no contractual guarantee to overtime.

Therefore, any claimed right to overtime by Dockmen of

other shifts when additional manpower

is needed on pier B, is not

contractually sustainable.
Article XII (Management Rights) of the contract contains a
specific provision supportive of the Company's actions in this
case.

Among the expressed management rights is the right to:
Determine the hours of work, the numbers and
classification of employees required, work
schedules and the assignment of work to be
performed by employees of whatever nature....
(emphasis added).
This provision accords the Company the right to use the

"employees of whatever nature" to work on pier B, including Fieldmen as well as Dockmen.

And I find nothing in the contract that
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gives that work exclusively to Dockmen, or otherwise restricts
that management right.
The Union argues that this managerial right is restricted,
as is the temporary

transfer provision of Article VI of the con-

tract, by the practice of first using Dockmen regardless of what
shift they may be assigned to, to man piers, before resorting to
non-Dockmen classifications.

But another express provision of

Article XII Management Rights is that the Company may:
"modify..., discontin(ue)...types of operations,
policies, practices and procedures.
(emphasis
added)
So, with the contractual right to modify and/or discontinue
practices, the Company is obviously not bound to the practices it
has followed on the other piers, and is not required to follow
that practice on pier B.

What it did on pier B, insofar as it is

inconsistent with its manning practices on the other piers has
been to "modify or change" that practice, as Article XII allows
it to do.
That the Company offered testimony on the type, frequency
and scheduling (or non-scheduling) of work on pier B in servicing
tugs and barges, that is different from the requirements on the
other piers, adds a business explanation if not a justification
of its different manning practices on pier B.

But in view of its

contractual right to man pier B differently when the circumstances
presented in this case occur, a business explanation or a justification would not be controlling either way.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and havin
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties,
makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate the collective
bargaining agreement by assigning workers
not classified as Plantman C to work as
Pier B Dockmen.
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Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: October 11, 1988
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 1533 Office & Professional
Employees International Union
OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
International Ladies' Garment
Workers Union

The stipulated issue is:
Was the discharge of Jacqueline Shillingford for
just cause? If not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on October 6, 1988 at the offices of Local
153, at which time Ms. 'Shillingford, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses0
The Arbitrator's Oath was waivedo
In my Award of April 4, 1988 I upheld the Employer's charges
against the grievant at that time, but reduced her discharge to a
disciplinary suspension because the Employer had failed to follow
the applicable procedure

of "progressive discipline0"

In that

Award, I also ruled:
"if henceforth her work record does not become
and is not maintained on a satisfactory level,
she shall be subject to discharge."
Pursuant to that Award, the grievant returned to work on May
2, 1988.

On May 20th, 1988, the Employer discharged her again.

In its letter to the Union dated May 19, 1988 notifying the Union
and the grievant of the discharge effective the next day, the
Employer charged the grievant basically with the same failings and
unsatisfactory work as charged in the earlier termination, plus
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some others.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.
7»
8.

Summarized, the charges are:

Insubordination.
Defiance of supervision and directives.
Unauthorized use of the telephone.
Highly unsatisfactory work performance
as to both quality and quantity.
Unauthorized and wrongful handling of
"printouts," and the unauthorized copying
of material covered by the Privacy Act.
Abuses and confrontational relations with
fellow employees.
Failure to return monies not hers.
Industrial sabotage.

At the hearing I dismissed the charge of industrial sabotage,
as unproved.

I find that the charges relating to "unauthorized

use of the telephone" and "abusive and confrontational relations
with fellow employees" have not been proved by the "clear and
convincing" standard required in discharge cases.

But, as in the

original decision, I again find that the charges relating to "insubordination," "defiance," "unsatisfactory work performance" have
been proved, as has the charge relating to "wrongful handling of
printouts and material covered by the Privacy Act."

There is not

enough evidence in the record to determine one way or the other,
the charge relating to "failure to return monies."
Though there are enough sustained charges to constitute a
continued unsatisfactory work record, within the meaning of my
prior Award and the words of final warning of that Award, I think
this case should be decided primarily on the grounds of "irreconcilable incompatibility" between the grievant and the Employer.
It is apparent to me that there is a total alienation between
the two.

The grievant believes, erroneously I conclude, that the
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Employer is engaged in a conspiracy against her.

She is so angry,

and so accusatory toward, and so intractable in her dealings with
the Employer's representatives, that I see no basis whatsoever
for a resumption of the employment relationship.

Similarly, the

Employer is equally angry, and exasperated, and so despairing and
unconditionally opposed to her continued employment, as to make
any resumption of the employment relationship unrealistic, counterproductive, and unhealthy for both the grievant and the
Employer.
I have repeatedly held, in many cases before me over the
years, that irreconcilable alienation between an employee and his
employer, is proper grounds for the termination of the employment
relationship.

That condition exists in this case, and that hold-

ing is applicable here.
Because some of the charges, including the serious charge of
"industrial sabotage," on which in part the discharge was based,
have not been proved, and because of the mutual antagonism, I conclude that though the termination of the grievant's employment shall
stand, the Employer shall grant some consideration for that result.
My Award shall particularize that concept.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Impartial Chairman
under the collective bargaining agreement between the above-named
parties, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of Jacqueline Shillingford was for
just cause and is sustained. However, in addition to any benefits to which she may be entitled

-4as a result of her discharge, the Employer
shall pay her "severance pay" in the amount
of two weeks pay at her regular rate of pay,

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: November 3, 1988
STATE OF New York )ss
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 153, Office & Professional
Employees International Union

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union

The stipulated issue is:
Was there sufficient and reasonable cause for
the discharge of Jacqueline Shellingford? If
not, what shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held on January 17, and March 14, 1988 at whic
time Ms. Shellingford, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant"
and representatives of Local 153, hereinafter referred to as the
"Union", and of International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union,
hereinafter referred to as the Employer appeared.

All concerned

were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

waived.
If there is any well settled arbitral rule, under collective
bargaining agreements, it is that an employer may discharge an
employee for unsatisfactory work performance including attendance
violations, but to do so it must utilize the process of progressive
discipline, by warnings and a suspension prior to termination.
This case fits squarely into that universally accepted principle.

The Employer has made out a clear and convincing case

showing the grievant's unsatisfactory work performance and attendance irregularities over an extended period of time.

The evidence

establishes that she was unable or failed to properly perform her
assigned duties regarding checking and processing Blue Cross, Blue
Shield_, optical and hospital benefit applications and that, in excessive amounts absented herself

from the job by reporting in

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 94 IUOE

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #AP7 - 1001

and
LaGuardia Hospital

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Robert Conroy? If not what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the New York State
Board of Mediation on February 17, 1988 at which time Mr. Conroy,
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of
the above-named Union and Employer appeared.

All concerned were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

waived.
The grievant was discharged for a cumulative record of offenses and work rule violations, culminating

in an alleged offense

on April 30, 1987, which "triggered" his termination.
On August 28, 1985 the grievant was given a warning for
"abuse of sick leave."

On April 24, 1986 he was suspended two

days for being 'absent without permission while on duty."

On

September 18, 1986 he was suspended three days for being "unfit
for duty."

On December 13, 1986 he was "threatened with a five

day suspension" for failure to provide written proof of professional care.

That suspension was not imposed when the proof re-

quested was provided.

On February 4, 1987 he was suspended for

two days for "leaving the premises...without permission."

On
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April 8, 1987 he received a warning for "absence from work" on
April 3, 1987 and "failure to notify department."
1987 a memo was placed in his file noting that

On April 24,

he "did not show

up for work on April 23" and that he did not "try to call sooner
than 10:30 AM."
The foregoing, to the extent that they involved disciplinary
actions, were not challenged or contested by the grievant or the
Union on his behalf at the time imposed or since.

Hence, they

must stand as an uncontroverted disciplinary record, and may not
be impeached in this proceeding.
Therefore, the question in this arbitration is whether the
grievant committed a subsequent offense, which, considering his
overall record, would "trigger" and justify his discharge.
The subsequent offense charged is that on April 30, 1987,
the grievant came to work unprepared to begin his shift at 7 AM.
The Employer claims that he did not punch in; that until 7:45 he
was still in street clothes; that he told a supervisor, for the
first time at about 8:05 (when he was in work uniform) that he had
wanted to take the day off, but then changed his mind; and asked
the supervisor to sign his time card as of 7 AM.
ployer's contention, based on a subsequent

It is the Em-

investigation, that the

grievant did not arrive at work until 7:20 AM; that he was in the
cafeteria from then until 7:45 when he first changed into his uniform; and that his request that the supervisor sign him in as of
7 AM was fraudulent.
The grievant's explanation and the Union's case on his behalf regarding the April 30th event, is that he had learned only
the night before that his son's confirmation was on the 30th; that
he came in to ask for the day off and dressed to go to the con-
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firmation, but, upon thought or realization that the day off would
not be granted, changed into his work clothes and decided to work
instead.

He asserts he was at the Hospital by 7 AM.

The evidence does not support the grievant's

explanation.

During the course of his own testimony, he admitted that he knew
a month or so earlier that his son was to be confirmed.

I con-

clude not only that he knew that, but also knew, well in advance,
the actual date of the confirmation.
based on the Employer's

Also, the credible evidence,

investigation supports the Employer's

conclusion that he did not get to the Hospital until about 7:20 AM
and that therefore his request that he be signed in as of 7 AM was
a falsification on his part.

That he spent from then until 7:45

AM before deciding to change into work clothes and go to work is
an obvious violation of rules of attendance and work rules, without any acceptable explanation.
Under the circumstances of his prior disciplinary record, it
is clear that the grievant was on notice by warnings and suspensions, that his record, and particularly his attendance was unsatisfactory, and that a continuation of that record would result
in discharge.

Therefore, he had a special duty and was legiti-

mately expected by the Hospital, to take extra measures and precaustions to report to work promptly; not to be off the job without permission; and to give timely notice of any absences or
planned absence.
or responsibility.

Clearly, on April 30th he did not meet that duty
He did not report to work on time.

He knew

in advance of his son's confirmation, but failed to make a timely
request for time off; and he compounded his errors by wasting
time he should have been at work, by locating himself in the cafeteria, in street clothes when he should have been at work.

And,
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as indicated, I must conclude, that his request to have his time
card signed showing his reporting time as 7 AM was an effort to
gain pay for time he did not work and to which he was not entitled
Against the backdrop of his prior disciplinary record, the
April 30th event constitutes an offense that justifiably triggers
further discipline, and under these circumstances, the further
discipline of discharge was warranted and proper, under the well
settled principles

of progressive

discipline.

The Union asserts that the grievant's difficulties were due
to a "drug problem;" that the Hospital knew of his drug problem,
tolerated it and even gave him a leave of absence for rehabilitation; and that in any event, the grievant's absences from work,
did not exceed the contractual sick leave limit.
This defense is rejected.
because of a drug problem.

The grievant was not discharged

He was discharged for the violation

of work rules and attendance rules referred to in each warning
notice suspension and in the discharge notice.

He was not fired

because he was ill, but largely because he failed to notify the
Employer of his whereabouts
required by the contract.

or of his absences within the time
The final incident of April 30th, cannot

be interpreted as related to his "drug problem."

He simply re-

fused or failed to act responsibly about what he was to do that
day - go to his son's confirmation or work;

and his attempt to

"cure" his late arrival and get paid was an act of falsification
that had nothing to do with a "drug problem."
The Hospital did not "tolerate" his drug problem in any way
that prejudices
to help him.
self.

its

right to take disciplinary action.

It tried

It gave him a leave of absence to rehabilitate him-

In so doing, however, it did not waive its right to disci-

pline him and terminate his employment if rehabilitation failed.

-5It cannot be punished or prejudiced by its magnanimity.

The prior

warnings and suspensions preserved the Hospital's right to impose
the final step of discharge if the grievant's offenses and infractions continued.
Finally, that the contract provides for a specific number
of sick days, does not mean that those days can be taken off, or
that portions of days may not be worked, or that time away from a
work station may be taken during working hours without proper notice and/or permission.

Also, chronic attendance problems, are

grounds for discipline and discharge, regardless of the reasons
for the absences, and even if the reasons are due to illness or
otherwise beyond an employee's fault or control.

And that applies

where the poor attendance record persists on a chronic basis and
in violation of specific rules, even if it may not exceed the
number of sick days provided in the contract.

In short, in the

instant case, the grievant's poor record simply does not fall
within the permissable or contractual number of sick days.

His

offenses, even if drug related, but uncontested except for the
final event of April 30th, add up to a chronic series of work rule
violations on his part, traditionally subject to and justifying
termination.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
There was just cause for the discharge of
Robert Conroy.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 7, 1988
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )SS'I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
I.B.E.W. Local Union

2100

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #52-30-0087-88

and
Louisville Gas & Electric Company

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate Article 25, Section 25.07
of the collective bargaining agreement? If so what
shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Louisville, Kentucky on September 29,
1988, at which time representatives of the above-named Union and
Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Each side filed a post-hearing brief.
What is not in dispute in this case is the Company's decisio
to reduce the truck crew size from at least two employees consisting of a Senior Cable Splicer and the other(s) from the three
Helper classifications (i.e. Helper C, B or A), to a one man
"crew" from the Cable Splicer A classification.

That question is

the subject of a different grievance and not part of this case.
What is in dispute in this matter, is the Union's claim that
when one man from the Cable Splicer A classification is assigned
to take out the truck alone, and to perform the cable-splicing
duties involved for an eight hour day, he should be paid at the
Senior Cable Splicer rate of pay for that assignment.
Article 25 Section 25.07 reads:
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Section 25.07. An employee who is temporarily
assigned to a higher job classification for
at least one (1) day, shall receive the rate
of pay for the classification at the time of
the assignment,, An employee assigned to fill
a temporary job vacancy in a tower job classification shall suffer no reduction in pay.
This section shall not be construed to modify
or restrict any other provision of this Agreement .
I am not persuaded that assignment to the truck alone constitutes a per se "assignment

to a higher job classification..."

within the meaning of Section 25.07.

The record does not show

that driving or handling the truck, and the equipment thereon has
been solely performed or is the sole responsibility of the Senior
Cable Splicer.
What is determinative, in my judgment, is whether under the
one man assignment, the Cable Splicer A so assigned, performs the
duties

or assumes the responsibilities of the classification,

Senior Cable Splicer.
The evidence shows that the principal duty of the Senior Cable
Splicer when a crew of two or more men were assigned, was to lead,
direct and control the employees from lower classifications.

Ob-

viously, when the "crew" is made up of a single Cable Splicer A,
there are no others to lead, direct or control, and hence that
responsibility and duty is not performed in the reduced crew
circumstance.
The question narrows to whether the single Cable Splicer A
performs or is required to perform other duties that, by practice,
or job description, have been performed exclusively or overwhelmingly by the Senior Cable Splicer„

Based on some questions I asked

-3of Joseph E. Wenger, a Cable Splicer A, and Mr. Wenger's answers
to those questions, I must conclude that he, in the capacity from
which this grievance arose, did not perform duties exclusive to
or primarily done by the Senior Splicer to an extent that would
warrant an upgrading.

The questions and answers, as follows, are

found on pages 35-38 of the transcript.
THE ARBITRATOR: Let me ask you a question, just
again for clarification. No inferences should
be drawn from Arbitrator's questions.
There's a time then when you were one of two
men on the truck?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE ARBITRATOR: And then there's a time that you
are the only person on the truck?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE ARBITRATOR: Could you tell me when you were
on the truck with a Senior Cable Splicer, what
did he do, and what did you do?
THE WITNESS: Well, of course, every job varies;
but generally each man has -- will do approximately half of the work. Which exact part you do
can vary from job to job, and it can overlap.
But generally you both split up the work You may
be doing the same thing at the same time.
THE ARBITRATOR: Did he do some actually splicing
work?
THE WITNESS: Oh, yes, sir.
THE ARBITRATOR: And tell me what kind of supervisory function he had with regard to your activities?
Did he lay out the work? Did he instruct you?
Did he inspect that work? What, if anything, did
he do?
THE WITNESS: Generally no to all of those questions,
generally, except for the inspection; and it's not
really an inspection. But the Senior man is the one
that will be disciplined if the work is not done
right0 And he should make sure that the work that
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he didn't actually do was done right, for his
own protection.
THE ARBITRATOR: So therefore does he look at
the work you do?
THE WITNESS: Not always, but it should be.
THE ARBITRATOR: Now, let me take you to the
later situation, when you've been on the truck
by yourself. Have you done things at that time
that are different, or were different from what
you did when you were a second man on the truck?
And if so -- if so, what were they?
THE WITNESS: As far as the actual work involved,
no; there is no difference between what I did,
or what an A or a Senior did.
The only difference when I had a truck is the
paperwork, and making sure everything I needed
was on the truck.
THE ARBITRATOR: Did you do the paperwork when
you were the only one on the truck that you
did not do when you were the second man on the
truck?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE ARBITRATOR: Tell me what that paperwork was
that you now do, or you did when you were the
only one on the truck, that you did not do when
there were two men on the truck.
THE WITNESS: All right. Let me clarify something
I had said earlier, that at one time I had done
paperwork for a Senior Splicer. He is no longer
with the company, but he couldn't -- he was
functionally illiterate; he couldn't read. I
did the paperwork for him.
Other than him, I haven't done the paperwork per
se for a Senior Splicer.
THE ARBITRATOR: When there were two on the truck?
THE WITNESS: When there were two on the truck. And
when there's one on the truck, all that paperwork -PAR, time sheets, trouble reports, meter tickets,
and so forth -- are done by me, if I'm the only
man.
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THE ARBITRATOR: Is it your testimony that
that's the actual difference in practice
between the duties you performed when a
Senior Cable Splicer was with you, and the
duties that you performed when you were alone?
THE WITNESS: That's the main difference in the
duties.
By his own testimony, the only significant set of duties
he did alone which he did not do when he worked with a Senior
Splicer is the "paper work" mentioned.
The job description of Cable Splicer A lists among

"General

Duties" Item #10: "Employee will compile information
and generate reports, forms and
documents as required."
That duty is also listed in the Senior Cable Splicer job
description.

So, it appears to me that the paper work in issue

here, is a concurrent responsibility and duty of both classifications, and therefore it cannot be successfully argued that it is
not a proper assignment to the Cable Splicer A, or that if he
does it he is doing higher rated work.

(Significantly, this duty

is not included in the Splicer Helper classification).
As no circumstance of any imposed discipline on a Cable
Splicer A for mistakes when he handled the truck and the assignments alone, has been set forth in this case, I find no basis to
deal with a hypothetical disciplinary consequence, as a basis to
support the upgrading claim.
Finally, the Union's claim that for the Cable Splicer A to
stock the truck is the work of the Senior Cable Splicer, has not
been adequately supported by the evidence.

Indeed the testimony

shows that the truck has been stocked by the crew members of lower
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classifications, under the instructions of the Senior Cable Splicer1
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate Article
25 Section 25.07 of the collective
bargaining agreement.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: November 21, 1988
STATE OF New York )ss> .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD0

